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EXAMINING THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF 
THE PLURALITY DECISION IN SHADY GROVE 
ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES V. ALLSTATE 
INSURANCE CO., AND ITS EFFECTS ON CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION 
Andrew J. Kazakes∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“In the sky, there is no distinction of east and west; people 
create distinctions out of their own minds and then believe 
them to be true.” 
                                                                        —Buddha 
 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.1 is 
the latest installment in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ongoing struggle 
to articulate a coherent analytical distinction between substantive and 
procedural rules as interpreted by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 
and its progeny (“the Erie doctrine”). While the Court cobbled 
together majority support for the judgment that in diversity cases 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) conflicted with and 
preempted a New York statutory prohibition against certain class 
action lawsuits, the justices divided sharply over the proper rationale 
supporting that result. By issuing a plurality opinion, the Court 
layered precedential uncertainty on doctrinal ambiguity. Decoding 
what Shady Grove means for Erie doctrine jurisprudence requires 
careful evaluation under the narrowest-grounds doctrine that the 
 
 ∗  J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., University of Chicago; B.A., 
Swarthmore College. The author thanks Dean Michael Waterstone and the editors and staff of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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Court set forth in Marks v. United States.3 This Comment seeks to 
determine what precedential consequences follow from Shady Grove 
under the Marks doctrine and what such consequences will mean for 
future applications of the Erie doctrine—in particular for state class 
action litigation. 
Part II provides a summary of the Court’s decision in Shady 
Grove. Part III provides a brief overview of the Erie doctrine in 
preparation for the discussion of the Court’s fragmented Shady 
Grove opinion in Part IV. Part V analyzes the precedential import of 
Shady Grove under the narrowest-grounds doctrine and then 
discusses the implications of Shady Grove for the Erie doctrine and 
for class action litigation in light of the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA). Part VI concludes. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After an automobile accident, Sonia E. Galvez received medical 
treatment from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates (“Shady 
Grove”), a Maryland corporation.4 Galvez assigned to Shady Grove 
her rights to recover insurance benefits under her insurance policy, 
issued in New York by Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), an 
Illinois corporation.5 Shady Grove submitted a claim to Allstate.6 
Under New York law, the claim would be subject to statutory interest 
of two percent per month if Allstate failed to pay or deny benefits 
within thirty days.7 Allstate paid late but refused to remit statutory 
interest, which amounted to roughly $500.8 
Alleging that Allstate routinely failed to remit statutory interest, 
Shady Grove brought a class action suit in the Eastern District of 
New York on behalf of itself and other putative class members, 
claiming diversity jurisdiction.9 The district court found that statutory 
interest constituted a statutory “penalty” under New York law and 
 
 3. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). The Marks doctrine has been characterized by the Court as 
“more easily stated than applied . . . .” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994). 
 4. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431. 
 5. Id. at 469–70. 
 6. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1436–37. 
 9. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 469, 472. 
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that section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules10 
precluded any class action claim for such a penalty, even though 
Rule 23 would not have barred the class action.11 Since Shady 
Grove’s individual claim did not meet the federal amount-in-
controversy requirement,12 the district court concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter.13 
The Second Circuit affirmed on the basis that section 901(b) and 
Rule 23 address different issues and therefore do not conflict.14 The 
court reasoned that Rule 23 addresses prerequisites for class 
certification,15 whereas section 901(b) limits the types of claims 
eligible for class action treatment even if all of Rule 23’s 
certification requirements are met. Therefore, the court reasoned, 
section 901(b) is substantive, not procedural, and must be applied in 
federal diversity cases pursuant to the Erie doctrine.16 
III.  THE ERIE DOCTRINE IN A NUTSHELL 
To better understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady 
Grove, it will be helpful to briefly review the Court’s vertical choice-
of-law17 jurisprudence following the Court’s seminal decision in 
Erie. In its most general formulation, the Erie doctrine provides that 
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction18 apply federal 
 
 10. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010). 
 11. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 472, 475. 
 12. To meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction, a 
plaintiff must seek more than $75,000 in relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 13. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
 14. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143–45 (2d Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 15. The four prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 are numerosity, typicality, 
commonality, and adequacy of representation. Id. at 143. In addition, the type of claim must fall 
into one of three categories. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). 
 16. Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 143–45. 
 17. A “vertical choice-of-law” problem refers to a situation in which a court must decide 
whether to apply a state or federal rule. A “horizontal choice-of-law” problem involves which of 
two or more states’ laws should apply. The Supreme Court has ruled that a federal court should 
apply the horizontal choice-of-law rules of the state in which the federal court sits. See Klaxon 
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 18. For the sake of brevity, all future references to federal court activity pertain to diversity 
jurisdiction. The two general requirements for diversity jurisdiction are that the amount-in-
controversy requirement is met and that there is complete diversity between the parties, meaning 
that every plaintiff is a resident of a different state than every defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
(2006). CAFA relaxed the complete diversity requirement for class actions in which more than 
$5,000,000 is in controversy, authorizing diversity jurisdiction so long as any plaintiff is diverse 
from any defendant (with some exceptions). Id. § 1332(d). 
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procedural rules but state substantive law.19 The doctrine nominally 
originated with the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie and has 
developed through the Court’s interpretation of two federal statutes: 
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“the Rules of Decision Act” 
or RDA)20 and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (“the Rules Enabling 
Act” or REA).21 Under the Court’s pre-Erie jurisprudence, federal 
courts had to apply state statutory law, but not state court decisions.22 
Federal courts could thus ignore state court interpretations of state 
statutes and impose an independent federal common law on the 
states.23 Writing for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis declared that 
“[t]here is no federal general common law” because the Constitution 
does not confer power on either Congress or the federal courts to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.24 In 
reaching this result, the Court addressed the problem that litigants 
were manipulating federal diversity jurisdiction to achieve desired 
outcomes in federal court that were not possible under applicable 
state law.25 Discouraging forum shopping and minimizing disparate 
legal outcomes in state versus federal courts came to be known as the 
“twin aims of Erie,”26 and they remain important policy touchstones 
in most applications of the Erie doctrine. 
At its core, Erie established a strong federalism principle: to 
uphold the constitutional division of power between the state and 
federal legal systems, federal courts were bound to apply the states’ 
 
 19. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 465 (1965)). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded 
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”). 
 21. Id. § 2072. 
 22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938) (discussing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 78. Some scholars have critiqued Justice Brandeis’ constitutional reasoning in Erie, 
arguing that the commerce clause could be construed to confer such power. See Adam N. 
Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of 
Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 312–13 (2008). 
 25. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74 (discussing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown 
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a Kentucky corporation 
reincorporated in Tennessee for the purpose of manufacturing diversity jurisdiction to sue in 
federal court on a contract void under Kentucky law). 
 26. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
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own definitions of litigants’ substantive rights when sitting in 
diversity.27 However, Erie provided little guidance to courts in the 
critical determination of whether a particular state law should be 
labeled substantive or procedural.28 To complicate matters, four years 
before the Erie decision, Congress had passed the Rules Enabling 
Act, which empowered federal courts to “prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure” and led to the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.29 Following Erie, the Court had to devise a 
framework to promulgate uniform federal rules of procedure while 
respecting state law in diversity cases.30 
The Court eventually developed a bifurcated approach to 
vertical choice-of-law questions. In Hanna v. Plumer,31 a case 
involving a conflict between federal and state service of process 
standards, 32 the Court established two distinct analyses depending on 
whether a vertical choice-of-law question was guided or unguided.33 
A court faces an unguided Erie choice if no Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (“Federal Rule”)34 covers the legal issue presented or the 
Federal Rule is invalid.35 In an unguided Erie choice, a court must 
choose between applying a state procedural rule or a judicially 
created federal procedural standard based on which of the two would 
best further Erie’s twin policy aims.36 If, after weighing these twin 
 
 27. See id. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing Erie as “one of the modern 
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial 
power between the state and federal systems”); see also Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 
U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (“Erie R.[R.] Co. v. Tompkins has been applied with an eye alert to essentials 
in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts. A policy so important to 
our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties.”). 
 28. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 258–61. 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); Steinman, supra note 24, at 260. 
 30. Steinman, supra note 24, at 258. 
 31. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 32. Id. at 461. 
 33. Id. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing 
the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice.” (italics added)). 
 34. This Comment follows other Erie scholarship in using the capitalized term “Federal 
Rule” to refer to true Federal Rules of Civil Procedure passed in accordance with the Rules 
Enabling Act, as distinguished from other federal rules, such as those derived from the principle 
of stare decisis. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 261 n.104. 
 35. Some commentators have questioned the clarity of the distinction between guided and 
unguided Erie choices. Steinman, supra note 24, at 282–83 (noting that because the meaning of a 
Federal Rule is largely determined not by the Rule’s text but by judicial gloss, there is a 
surprisingly strong argument for treating choices between state law and Federal Rules as 
unguided). 
 36. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
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aims, a court concludes that the choice of rules would be “outcome-
affective,” the state rule is deemed to be substantive and to apply in 
federal court, provided there is no countervailing federal interest in 
maintaining a uniform system of federal procedural rules.37 
A court faces a guided Erie choice when a legal issue is fully 
covered by an existing Federal Rule or another established federal 
procedural doctrine.38 Under this analysis, a court must first decide if 
the Federal Rule directly conflicts with the state rule by determining 
if applying the Federal Rule would leave any room for the state 
rule’s operation.39 In making this determination, the court considers 
if the Federal Rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid a conflict.40 
If a direct collision between the Federal Rule and state law is 
unavoidable, then the Federal Rule prevails and displaces the state 
law pursuant to the supremacy clause,41 provided that the Federal 
Rule is both constitutional (construed to mean that it is “rationally 
capable of classification” as procedural)42 and compliant with the 
REA, which mandates that applying a Federal Rule shall not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”43 The Supreme 
Court has struggled to interpret the scope and meaning of this REA 
language. In particular, the Court has had difficulty articulating a 
coherent distinction between cases in which a Federal Rule 
incidentally (but permissibly) affects litigation outcomes and those in 
which a Federal Rule impermissibly alters litigants’ substantive 
rights.44 
The Supreme Court’s previous attempts to draw this line led to 
equivocation concerning whether courts should only evaluate the 
 
 37. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 38. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–72. While guided Erie choices typically involve a Federal Rule, 
it is not a prerequisite. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 261. 
 39. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 
471–72). 
 40. The Court has never found a Federal Rule invalid under the REA and appears to prefer 
either applying the Federal Rule or interpreting the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict. See Lucas 
Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
285, 296 (2010); see, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 817, 842, 845 (1999) 
(interpreting Rule 23 to “minimize[] potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act”). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Steinman, supra note 24, at 312. 
 42. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 44. Steinman, supra note 24, at 270. 
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procedural nature of a given Federal Rule or should also evaluate the 
threatened state law’s significance to state definitions of substantive 
rights. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,45 the Court stated that a Federal 
Rule complies with the REA if it “really regulates procedure.”46 The 
Sibbach Court held that Rule 35, which requires a party to submit to 
a physical examination if physical condition is at issue in the case, 
regulated procedure and therefore trumped a conflicting Illinois rule 
prohibiting such examinations.47 In so holding, the Court rejected the 
argument that applying the Federal Rule would violate the 
petitioner’s substantive right to be free from bodily intrusion under 
Illinois law.48 The Court concluded that a standard that focused on 
the importance of the state right threatened with displacement, rather 
than on whether the Federal Rule covered the litigation’s procedural 
aspects, would force courts to pass judgment on the relative value of 
the policies underlying state laws and thereby “invite endless 
litigation and confusion worse confounded.”49 In contrast, the Court 
in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.50 noted that in deciding 
whether a Federal Rule should trump state law, “[f]ederal courts 
have interpreted the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important 
state interests and regulatory policies.”51 This doctrinal gap is what 
drove the Court to plurality in Shady Grove. 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A majority of the Court in Shady Grove agreed that section 
901(b) and Rule 23 actually conflicted. Facing a guided Erie 
choice,52 a majority of the Court agreed that Rule 23 was valid under 
the REA and that section 901(b) was not a substantive rule. 
However, the Court failed to reach a consensus about the proper 
 
 45. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 46. Id. at 14 (defining procedure as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them”). 
 47. Id. at 14–16. 
 48. Id. at 11. The Court also refused petitioner’s proposed standard that “substantive” state 
rights should be construed to mean “important” or “substantial” rights under the state law 
scheme. Id. 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 51. Id. at 428 n.7. 
 52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468, 471 (1965); Steinman, supra note 24, at 282–83; 
see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432. 
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standard to apply in distinguishing between procedural and 
substantive rules generally. In particular, the Court struggled to 
decide whether a state procedural rule that is “bound-up with” a 
state’s definition of substantive rights is cognizable under the Court’s 
Erie analysis.53 
Justice Scalia’s lead opinion garnered mixed support, with 
division in the Court cutting across ideological lines. The numerical 
breakdown in votes was as follows: five votes for the result that 
section 901(b) conflicts with and is preempted by Rule 23—with a 
4–1 split in the reasoning used to reach the result and Justice Stevens 
writing separately; three votes supporting Justice Scalia’s rebuttal to 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence (with Justice Sotomayor withdrawing 
support); and four votes in dissent.54 
A.  Majority Support for the Result: Justice Scalia’s Lead Opinion 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the 
Second Circuit’s distinction between certifiability and eligibility as 
artificial, observing that both Rule 23 and section 901(b) address the 
same question: whether a litigant may maintain a class action 
lawsuit.55 Justice Scalia read into the language of Rule 23 a litigant’s 
affirmative entitlement to proceed with a class action if the litigant 
meets Rule 23’s prerequisites.56 Since section 901(b) precluded 
Shady Grove from proceeding with its class action even if it met 
Rule 23’s prerequisites, the two rules unavoidably conflicted, 
necessitating a guided Erie analysis.57 Justice Scalia concluded that 
Rule 23 is consistent with the REA because applying Rule 23 would 
 
 53. Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444–
47 & nn.9–15 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (arguing against cognizability), with Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453–55 & nn.8–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing for limited cognizability). 
 54. Justice Scalia received majority support with respect to Parts I and II-A of his opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Stevens. Id. at 1435. 
Justice Sotomayor withdrew support for Part II-C, and Justice Stevens withdrew support for Parts 
II-B through II-D, submitting a separate concurring opinion. Id. Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito joined in dissent. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1437–38. Section 901(b) closely tracks Rule 23’s class certification criteria. Id. at 
1464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 1442 (Scalia, J., majority opinion). Justice Scalia argued that section 901(b)’s 
additional subject-matter limitations could not be harmonized with Rule 23 because Rule 23 
“authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding to maintain a class action if the Rule’s 
prerequisites are met.” Id. 
 57. Id. at 1439. 
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not affect any plaintiff’s substantive right to pursue statutory 
penalties individually; rather, it would only affect class members’ 
ability to pool their individual claims into one lawsuit.58 
B.  Doctrinal Disconnect: Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens’ 
Disagreement over the Cognizability of State Policy Interests 
While Justice Scalia corralled majority support for his 
disposition of the case, he lost Justice Stevens’ support for his 
approach to analyzing whether a Federal Rule complies with the 
REA. According to Justice Scalia, courts should follow Sibbach by 
limiting REA analysis to determining whether a Federal Rule “really 
regulates procedure” and disregarding the nature of the state law 
threatened with displacement.59 A Federal Rule “really regulates 
procedure,” in Justice Scalia’s view, if it governs “the manner and 
the means by which the litigants’ rights are enforced” but does not 
alter the rules of decision by which courts adjudicate those rights.60 
While acknowledging that this categorical approach encourages 
forum shopping,61 Justice Scalia maintained that such a result is a 
tolerable price to pay to preserve a uniform system of federal 
procedural rules.62 
Justice Stevens wrote separately to express a different 
conception of the REA analysis that courts should follow. Justice 
Stevens’ disagreement with Justice Scalia concerned whether courts 
should scrutinize the policies behind a conflicting state rule to ensure 
that a facially procedural rule does not actually define the contours of 
state substantive rights.63 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence seems to straddle the judgment of 
 
 58. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 59. Id. at 1444 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1941)). 
 60. Id. at 1442 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 
326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
 61. Claims based in state law that would be barred under the same state’s procedural rules 
could still be maintained if brought in federal court. Id. at 1447. 
 62. Id. at 1447–48. 
 63. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As an 
illustration, Justice Stevens noted that a statute of limitations is procedural in the sense that it only 
governs a plaintiff’s ability to access court procedures to enforce separately defined substantive 
rights. However, a statute of limitations also defines the temporal scope of a plaintiff’s 
substantive rights and expresses the state’s policy judgment about a tortfeasor’s right to repose, to 
be free from the perpetual threat of lawsuit. See id. at 1453 n.9; see also Guaranty Trust Co. of 
N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (applying state statute of limitations in federal diversity case). 
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the Court and the reasoning of the dissent.64 Observing that the line 
separating substance from procedure is often hazy, Justice Stevens 
argued that courts must determine whether a seemingly procedural 
rule is “so bound up” or “intertwined” with substantive rules that it 
defines the scope of state rights or remedies.65 Courts must therefore 
be “sensitiv[e] to important state interests” when faced with a guided 
Erie choice.66 Because “[i]n some instances, a state rule that appears 
procedural really is not,” this approach ensures that applying a 
Federal Rule does not trammel a state rule of procedure that 
inextricably contributes to a state’s definition of substantive rights.67 
Making this determination requires evaluating on a case-by-case 
basis how a state procedural rule fits into the state’s statutory scheme 
and how it relates to the state policies that the scheme was designed 
to promote. Justice Stevens set a high threshold for such a finding, 
limiting the determination to those rare cases in which there is “little 
doubt” that the procedural rule helps define substantive rights.68 
Concluding that section 901(b) did not constitute one of those rare 
instances, Justice Stevens joined in the judgment that Rule 23 
displaces section 901(b) in federal court.69 
The resulting debate between the justices concerned whether 
federal courts should ever countenance state procedural rules that are 
inextricably bound up with substantive state rights and remedies. 
Justice Scalia contended that federal courts should never do so, citing 
concerns over judicial economy and doctrinal clarity.70 In Justice 
 
 64. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Scalia that section 901(b) is unequivocally 
procedural, in direct conflict with Rule 23, and therefore preempted by Rule 23. However, Justice 
Stevens also agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s argument that federal courts sitting in diversity must 
sometimes apply state procedural rules when such rules define substantive rights and remedies. 
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Stevens’ analysis subtly differs from Justice Ginsburg’s because Justice Stevens endorses 
looking at state substantive policies to determine whether a Federal Rule complies with the REA 
after concluding that the federal and state rules conflict, whereas Justice Ginsburg would apply 
this analysis to determine whether a conflict exists. See Max W. Berger & Geoffrey Brounell, 
Shady Grove and the Future of State-Law Restrictions on Class Action Lawsuits, in CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION STRATEGIES 2010, at 281, 302 n.141 (Jayne A. Goldstein & Howard S. 
Suskin eds., 2010). 
 65. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450, 1452–53, 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 66. Id. at 1452. 
 67. Id. at 1453 n.8. 
 68. Id. at 1457. 
 69. Id. at 1456. 
 70. Id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). According to Justice Scalia, federal judges 
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Scalia’s view, Justice Stevens’ case-by-case, purpose-driven 
approach is unworkable and contrary to the Court’s Sibbach 
precedent.71 Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia’s view as 
incompatible with the language of the REA, which requires courts to 
do more than simply focus on whether the Federal Rule at issue 
“really regulates procedure.”72 Justice Stevens argued that a court 
cannot know whether a Federal Rule “really regulates procedure” 
without considering the nature and purpose of the state law that the 
Federal Rule would displace.73 
C.  Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
The dissent construed section 901(b) as a substantive cap on 
damages and therefore argued that it did not conflict with Rule 23, 
which only deals with class certification criteria. The dissent argued 
that because section 901(b) makes little sense as a procedural rule, it 
must be substantive in purpose. Because claims for statutory 
damages do not require proof of actual damages, they are best suited 
to the class action device.74 Section 901(b) therefore bears no relation 
to judicial economy, a major policy purpose behind Rule 23.75 
Instead, the New York legislature had two substantive purposes in 
mind when it passed section 901(b): (1) to avoid excessive 
compensation for plaintiffs76 and (2) to prevent plaintiffs from 
exploiting this excess liability by bringing unmeritorious claims in 
 
would be “condemned to poring through state legislative history.” Id. at 1441. 
 71. Id. at 1445–47 nn.9–10, nn.12–13. 
 72. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Stevens argued that Justice Scalia unnecessarily worried about the difficulty of determining 
whether seemingly procedural state rules are bound up with substantive rights because facially 
valid federal rules rarely conflict with such quasi-procedural state laws. Id. at 1455 n.13. 
 73. Id. at 1454 n.10. 
 74. Id. at 1464–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg began her dissent by 
characterizing Shady Grove’s class action suit as a form of “alchemy” transforming a $500 case 
into a $5,000,000 award. Id. at 1460. But see id. at 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (responding that Shady Grove transforms 10,000 $500 claims into 
one $5,000,000 claim). 
 75. Id. at 1466–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 1464–65. Both the class action device and statutory penalties are legislative tools 
to make otherwise negative-value lawsuits—lawsuits in which the cost of bringing the lawsuit 
exceeds individual expected recovery—worthwhile for plaintiffs. See Watkins, supra note 40, at 
287 n.22, 294–95. However, when these two tools are combined, some argue, they can lead to 
greater defendant liability than is necessary to overcome the problem of negative-value lawsuits, 
creating excessive, and in some instances annihilative, liability. See id. at 294–95; Shady Grove, 
130 S. Ct. at 1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the form of class action lawsuits as leverage to force settlement.77 
The dissent further observed that New York courts have 
routinely allowed class action suits to proceed when class members 
waive the right to receive statutory damages, and they pursue only 
actual damages.78 The dissent interpreted this to mean that section 
901(b) is not directed at controlling whether certain class actions 
may begin but rather at controlling how they end—in other words, it 
determines what remedies are available to class litigants.79 Since 
Rule 23 does not address this issue, Justice Ginsburg did not believe 
that it conflicted with section 901(b)’s substantive limitation on 
remedies.80 As a result, Justice Ginsburg would have affirmed the 
Second Circuit’s judgment.81 
While Justice Stevens’ analysis was similar to Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting argument, Justice Stevens criticized the 
dissent’s view as an “end run around Congress’ system of uniform 
federal rules.”82 While agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the 
Court’s Erie analysis should be sensitive to important state interests, 
Justice Stevens nevertheless maintained that “the bar for finding an 
[REA] problem is a high one.”83 Justice Stevens therefore 
distinguished between procedural rules that are intimately bound up 
with defining substantive state rights or remedies and procedural 
rules adopted merely for some policy reason.84 Justice Stevens thus 
rejected the dissent’s discussion of New York’s legislative history 
with respect to section 901(b).85 
 
 77. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 1467 n.9. 
 79. Id. at 1467–68. 
 80. Id. at 1468–69. 
 81. Id. at 1473. 
 82. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 83. Id. at 1456–57. 
 84. Id. at 1458. 
 85. Justice Stevens considered it evidence merely that the legislature was motivated by the 
policy interest to limit the likelihood of crushing liability against class action defendants, rather 
than a finding that section 901(b) defined state rights per se. Id. at 1458–59. After all, section 
901(b) does not prohibit a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for statutory interest—it only prohibits 
doing so in a class format. Id. Justice Scalia also rejected the dissent’s “purpose-driven” analysis 
as misguided on the ground that it could lead to inconsistent results between two identically 
worded state statutes when one state legislature evinces a substantive intent while the other does 
not. Id. at 1440–41 (Scalia, J., majority opinion). 
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V.  ANALYSIS: LIMITED PRECEDENT UNDER THE 
NARROWEST-GROUNDS DOCTRINE BUT POTENTIALLY 
BROAD EFFECTS ON CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
Under the narrowest-grounds doctrine, Justice Scalia and Justice 
Stevens’ plurality opinions likely carry no precedential weight and 
should be viewed as persuasive authority only. Even if it is limited to 
its facts, however, Shady Grove will resonate in the class action 
litigation context because the Court’s reasoning suggests that other 
state efforts to regulate class actions may be prone to attack in 
federal court. 
A.  Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens’ Concurring Opinions 
Lack a Rational Common Denominator Under the 
Narrowest-Grounds Doctrine 
At common law, the precedential weight of a plurality decision 
was limited only to the particular result.86 Lower courts could 
therefore ignore the various rationales provided in plurality decisions 
and would only have to follow such decisions in future cases 
presenting substantially the same narrow factual situation.87 In 
Marks, the Supreme Court issued its only official guidance for 
determining the precedential scope of the Court’s plurality 
decisions.88 The Court reconsidered the precedential value of its 
previous plurality decision in A Book Named “John Cleland’s 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of 
Massachusetts, 89 concluding that “[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case . . . the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
 
 86. Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: 
Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 278 (2000). 
 87. Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A 
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 
104–05 (2007). 
 88. Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1603 (1992). While beyond the scope of this Comment, legal scholars 
have proposed a variety of alternative models for determining the precedential value of plurality 
opinions. See Cacace, supra note 87 (applying social choice theory to interpretation of plurality 
opinions); Kimura, supra at 1600–24 (proposing five-category system for identifying the 
precedential value of a plurality decision). 
 89. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
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the narrowest grounds.”90 This section summarizes how courts and 
commentators have generally interpreted the narrowest-grounds 
doctrine, and it then applies the resulting framework to the Shady 
Grove decision. It concludes that the holding in Shady Grove should 
be limited to its facts. 
1.  Narrowest-Grounds Requirements 
Courts and commentators that have considered the meaning of 
the Marks rule have concluded that Marks does not apply to all 
plurality decisions, and they have generally identified two related 
requirements in determining whether a narrowest ground exists in 
such a decision.91 First, the narrowest-ground opinion must enjoy the 
implicit support of a majority of the justices concurring in the 
judgment.92 Dissenting opinions are excluded from consideration, 
whatever their reasoning, because there is no logical nexus between a 
dissenting opinion and the disposition of the case.93 Second, the 
narrowest ground must be the logical subset of another broader 
plurality opinion, so that each fits into the other “like Russian 
dolls.”94 In other words, there must be a rational “common 
denominator” underlying the opinions of those justices concurring in 
the judgment.95 For example, a plurality opinion upholding a law 
under rational basis review shares a logical common denominator 
with a plurality opinion upholding the same law under strict scrutiny 
because a law that survives under strict scrutiny ipso facto survives 
 
 90. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). 
 91. Cacace, supra note 87, at 110; Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03. 
 92. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (specifying that only “those Members who concurred in the 
judgments” can support a narrowest ground (emphasis added)). 
 93. See Cacace, supra note 87, at 111 & nn.111–14; Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03 
(noting that reliance on dissenting opinions to construe the legal rule resulting from a case entails 
that the disposition is not justified); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United 
States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 328 (2000). 
 94. Cacace, supra note 87, at 111, 129–30; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1993). 
 95. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 
1229 (1992); Rafael A. Seminario, Comment, The Uncertainty and Debilitation of the Marks 
Fractured Opinion Analysis—The U.S. Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity: Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 739, 761 (2004); see, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 
745 (1994) (citing three Courts of Appeals that found no rational common denominator, and 
therefore no narrowest grounds representing the Court’s holding in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 
222 (1980)). 
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rational basis review.96 Those justices concluding that a law survives 
strict scrutiny can be said to implicitly support the position that the 
law survives rational basis review, resulting in a constructive 
majority. 
If the above two requirements are met but it is unclear which is 
the narrower of two plurality decisions, the narrowest ground is 
considered the opinion that will affect or control the fewest laws or 
cases in the future.97 Thus, if the result of a plurality decision is to 
uphold a law against constitutional attack, the opinion that would 
uphold the fewest laws is the narrowest ground. If the result is to 
invalidate a law, however, the opinion that would strike down the 
fewest laws is the narrowest ground.98 
2.  Applying the Narrowest-Grounds Doctrine to Shady Grove 
As a preliminary matter, the narrowest-grounds doctrine 
excludes from consideration Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.99 
It might be tempting to conclude that Justice Stevens’ approach is 
controlling because he garnered the dissent’s implicit support. 
However, this conclusion confuses the narrowest-grounds model of 
plurality interpretation with the dual-majority model. A dual majority 
occurs when the dissenting opinion and one of the concurring 
opinions advocate the same legal rule (resulting in one majority for 
the result and a separate majority for the legal rule—precisely what 
occurred in Shady Grove).100 While there may be good arguments for 
adopting the dual-majority model, it is analytically distinct from the 
narrowest-grounds model that the Supreme Court selected in Marks. 
Narrowest-grounds analysis does not count dissenting opinions 
 
 96. Kimura, supra note 88, at 1603–04. Some scholars have criticized the theory of implicit 
support underlying the narrowest grounds doctrine. See Cacace, supra note 87, at 111 n.114; 
Kimura, supra note 88, at 1604, 1616–18. 
 97. Cacace, supra note 87, at 111. 
 98. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 94, at 47. It is also worth mentioning that at least one 
lower court has suggested that an opinion to which only a single justice subscribes can never 
qualify as binding precedent. See King, 950 F.2d at 782 (“When eight of nine Justices do not 
subscribe to a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that 
approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it may be.”). 
 99. See King, 950 F.2d at 783 (“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a dissent with a 
concurrence to form a Marks majority.”); Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03. But see Cacace, 
supra note 87, at 111–12 (noting that some justices have analyzed dissenting opinions in 
determining which test a lower court should apply). 
 100. See Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03. 
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because to do so would delegitimize the result (which the dissent 
opposed).101 Despite its partial alignment with Justice Stevens’ 
approach, the Shady Grove dissent cannot carry precedential 
weight.102 
The critical question is therefore whether a rational common 
denominator exists between Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’ 
concurrences. There appears to be none. The justices presented two 
conflicting approaches to the same issue, with each justice criticizing 
the other’s approach at length. Justice Scalia adamantly rejected the 
proposition that courts should spend time investigating the legislative 
intent behind state procedural rules, referring to such inquiries as 
“standardless” and contrary to Sibbach.103 Conversely, Justice 
Stevens argued that the only way courts can give meaning to the 
REA limitation is to carefully examine whether the state procedural 
rule is inextricably bound up with the state’s definition of substantive 
rights. While Justice Stevens would set a high bar for finding a 
Federal Rule incompatible with the REA, he nevertheless opens the 
door to this analysis, which Justice Scalia does not.104 
This conceptual disagreement is more than academic. The 
dissent reached the opposite result using an approach similar to the 
one that Justice Stevens advocated. In close cases, the weight 
assigned to legislative intent determines whether state laws, and the 
lawsuits invoking them, survive or perish.105 Given that Justices 
Scalia and Stevens stake out opposite positions on this narrow but 
critical issue, there is no rational common denominator between their 
opinions. They represent parallel lines of analysis, each extending 
from the facts to the result without meeting or touching each other. 
Under the narrowest-grounds doctrine, therefore, their approaches 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. The dissent’s analysis substantively differs from Justice Stevens’ analysis with respect to 
the point in a guided Erie analysis at which courts should consider state interests. Justice Stevens 
would weigh state interests after concluding that a state law conflicted with a Federal Rule, 
whereas Justice Ginsburg would consider state interests in determining if a conflict even existed. 
Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b)), with id. at 
1455–57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the dissent’s 
approach as “an end run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules”). 
 103. Id. at 1441 n.7, 1445 n.9 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 104. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 105. See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP-
65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010). 
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constitute mere persuasive authority for lower courts. 
Even assuming that Scalia’s and Stevens’ opinions did logically 
overlap, it is unclear whether Stevens’ approach is the narrower of 
the two.106 As between two methodologies used to decide which 
jurisdiction’s law—the state’s or federal government’s—will 
displace the other’s, scope is relative to jurisdiction. Justice Stevens’ 
approach is narrower in the sense that it would result in the 
preemption of moderately fewer state laws, but also broader in the 
sense that it would result in the displacement of federal law by an 
equal number of state laws. Alternatively, it is unclear which of the 
justices’ approaches would affect fewer cases.107 Viewed strictly in 
the context of class certification, Scalia’s approach is arguably 
narrower in that it would result in the decertification of fewer class 
actions. In considering the consequence of the decision beyond the 
class action context, however, it becomes difficult to predict which 
of the two justices’ approaches would have less far-reaching effects 
on litigation. 
3.  Missing the Marks: The Narrowest-Grounds 
Doctrine as Applied to Shady Grove 
In early decisions applying Shady Grove, courts have favored 
Justice Stevens’ more flexible approach. However, their narrowest-
grounds analyses have been anemic and sometimes nonexistent. 
Several courts have purported to apply the narrowest-grounds 
doctrine but concluded that Stevens’ approach constituted the 
controlling “narrowest grounds” either because it was “critical” or 
“crucial” to the result or because it accorded with the dissent, even 
though a dissent ipso facto cannot support the Court’s disposition.108 
 
 106. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 128 n.135), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1633541 (“[I]n Shady Grove the word “narrowest” has no clear meaning. . . . In any event, Marks 
certainly did not mean to give a concurring Justice the power to hijack the law.”). 
 107. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 108. Garman ex rel. Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 08-8101, 2010 WL 
5191359, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2010) (finding Justice Stevens’ concurrence “critical” because 
he concluded the rule at issue was not part of substantive state law); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 
79, 86–89 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Justice Stevens’ concurrence); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust 
Litig., No. 08-2433, 2010 WL 5186052, at *2–5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2010); see Estate of C.A. v. 
Grier, No. H-10-0531, 2010 WL 4236865, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2010) (concluding that 
Justice Stevens’ opinion was narrowest because his approach comported with the dissent); 
Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *9–10 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 
16, 2010) (concluding that Justice Stevens’ concurrence was the narrowest grounds in Shady 
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The misattribution of precedential authority to Justice Stevens’ 
plurality opinion illustrates that lower courts do not apply the 
narrowest-grounds doctrine in a talismanic manner. While based on 
principles of logic, the doctrine is often treated as a rule of 
interpretation. In practice, lower courts rely on observations about 
what other lower courts have decided109 and predictions about how 
the Supreme Court would likely resolve a similar issue.110 
However, reliance on Justice Stevens’ concurrence may not be 
predictively accurate. Given Justice Stevens’ retirement, the Court’s 
disposition on the same or similar Erie issue likely depends on newly 
sworn-in Justice Kagan’s heretofore unknown views on the Erie 
doctrine.111 Because Shady Grove leaves important methodological 
issues unresolved, it seems likely that the Court will revisit its Erie 
jurisprudence sooner rather than later. 
B.  Implications for Class Action Litigation and CAFA Policy 
The Shady Grove decision renders state laws that bar categories 
of class action claims vulnerable to preemption in federal court.112 
 
Grove); In re Whirlpool Corp., 2010 WL 2756947, at *1–2 (partially decertifying a class on the 
ground that Rule 23, while not ultra vires under Justice Scalia’s approach, was ultra vires under 
Justice Stevens’ “crucial” concurrence). Other courts have cautiously applied both Justice 
Scalia’s approach and Justice Stevens’ approach. Retained Realty, Inc. v. McCabe, 376 F. App’x 
52, 55–56 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that Rule 54(b) superseded state law under either 
Justice Scalia’s or Justice Stevens’ approaches); Durmishi v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 862, 
875–77 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (analyzing purported conflict with Rule 35 under both Justice Scalia’s 
and Justice Stevens’ approaches). 
 109. When a plurality opinion befuddles lower courts and leads to inconsistent interpretations, 
the Supreme Court may decline to apply Marks and instead issue a new ruling on the matter. 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), illustrates this practical dimension in applications 
of Marks. In Nichols, the Court reconsidered its previous plurality decision in Baldasar v. Illinois, 
446 U.S. 222 (1980), regarding the constitutionality of certain criminal sentencing enhancements. 
Observing that the narrowest-grounds doctrine is “more easily stated than applied,” the Court, in 
deciding to overrule Baldasar rather than subject it to a Marks analysis, wrote, “We think it not 
useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously 
baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it. This degree of confusion following a 
splintered decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.” Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–
46. The Marks decision itself implicitly acknowledged that lower court consensus is a factor 
relevant to determining whether the narrowest-grounds doctrine is useful in analyzing particular 
plurality decisions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (noting that “every 
Court of Appeals that considered the question” reached the same conclusion as what the Marks 
Court concluded was the narrowest grounds in Memoirs). 
 110. See Hochschild, supra note 86, at 279–80; Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 94, at 45. 
 111. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie 
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 43 n.237), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677392. 
 112. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief for 
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The decision also raises many questions, three of which are 
discussed below. First, what does Shady Grove mean for the Court’s 
attitude toward CAFA policy? Second, will Shady Grove preclude 
state law caps on class action damages or only categorical bars on 
maintaining class actions? Finally, will Shady Grove limit other state 
regulations on class actions, such as state laws that augment class 
certification standards? 
1.  Shady Grove and CAFA policy 
Many commentators have noted that the motivation behind 
CAFA was to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring class 
action claims.113 Congress passed CAFA partly in response to 
concerns that state court judges were overeager to certify class 
actions because of political pressures tied to local judicial 
elections.114 By allowing class action defendants to remove state class 
action claims to federal court, CAFA allowed defendants to take 
advantage of the federal courts’ more stringent standards for class 
certification.115 Shady Grove does the opposite. By allowing plaintiffs 
to avoid restrictive state laws, the decision signals movement toward 
greater judicial leeway for class action plaintiffs bringing state law 
claims in federal court.116 
However, Shady Grove does not repudiate CAFA policy so 
much as soften its edges. First, legislative history indicates that 
Congress was motivated not just to limit the quantity of class action 
lawsuits but also to federalize suits with effects on the nation as a 
 
Respondent app. B, Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 93-106) (listing state statutes prohibiting 
class actions for particular claims). 
 113. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2525 n.42 (2008); Steinman, supra note 24, at 304 n.313. 
 114. See Burch, supra note 113, at 2526. By bringing a class action in a “judicial hellhole,” a 
class action attorney secured the best possible chance to have that class certified. See Georgene 
Vairo, Why I Don’t Teach Federal Courts Anymore, But Maybe Am or Will Again, 53 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 843, 850 (2009); Kimberly Nakamaru, Comment, Touching a Nerve: Hertz v. Friend’s 
Impact on the Class Action Fairness Act’s Minimum Diversity Requirement, 44 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1019, 1028 (2011). 
 115. Burch, supra note 113, at 2531 (reporting that state courts denied certification in 
12 percent of cases remanded from federal court while federal courts denied certification in 
27 percent of cases in which defendants removed to federal court). 
 116. In response, Justice Ginsburg suggested that Congress amend CAFA to prohibit 
maintenance of a class action in federal court that would be barred in the state under whose laws 
the class action is brought. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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whole.117 In this sense, Shady Grove is consistent with CAFA policy 
because the decision extends divestiture of the states’ control over 
class action litigation.118 Assuming that some class actions barred by 
state laws like section 901(b) would have national import, such laws 
frustrate rather than further this aspect of CAFA policy. Second, 
Shady Grove likely will not alter the federal courts’ present rate of 
decertification.119 While it expands forum access for class action 
plaintiffs, Shady Grove may be a pyrrhic victory for many litigants as 
district judges will likely review with heightened skepticism class 
certification requests that would have been barred under the laws of 
the states under which the class claims arose. 
2.  Shady Grove and Caps on Class Action Damages 
In Gasperini, the Court suggested that a statutory cap on 
damages for a particular cause of action would likely be considered 
substantive under Erie analysis.120 The dissent in Shady Grove 
accurately observed that Justice Scalia tied the result in Shady Grove 
to the fact that section 901(b) acts to categorically bar certain class 
actions from being maintained.121 Shady Grove thus appears facially 
agnostic about the federal preemption of state law damages caps. 
However, there is a lower threshold at which a damages cap would 
obviously function as a complete prohibition. For example, if section 
901(b) limited statutory damages to the amount the class 
representative could recover individually, the statute would 
nominally permit a class action to be “maintained” but would 
 
 117. See Burch, supra note 113, at 2525–26. 
 118. Whereas CAFA was viewed as an attempt to muzzle overzealous state court judges, 
Shady Grove can be viewed as reclaiming power from state legislatures. 
 119. See supra note 115. 
 120. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996); see Shady Grove, 130 
S. Ct. at 1439 n.4 (“[W]e express no view as to whether state laws that set a ceiling on damages 
recoverable in a single suit . . . are pre-empted.”) (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, 
app. A); id. at 1466 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress, in authorizing 
promulgation of the Federal Rules, could not have intended to displace state-created damages 
caps). 
 121. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia himself 
declined to address what his opinion in Shady Grove would have been if the state law at issue 
imposed a cap on damages instead of a categorical bar. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., majority opinion) 
(“We need not decide whether a state law that limits the remedies available in an existing class 
action would conflict with Rule 23.”). However, Justice Scalia also characterized Rule 23 as 
creating an entitlement to proceed with a class action so long as Rule 23’s requirements for class 
certification are met. Id. at 1438. 
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perform the same function as a categorical bar to the class action 
device.122 A state legislature writing a well-calibrated statute would 
of course set the cap high enough to avoid the appearance of 
obstructionism while rendering most class actions economically 
inhospitable to plaintiffs.123 
Even a well-calibrated state damages cap could arguably fall 
within the purview of Shady Grove, however, if it caused excessive 
interference with Rule 23’s certification requirements. With lower 
damages caps, class action plaintiffs may be forced as a practical 
matter to bring class actions with fewer class members. For instance, 
if individual claims in a class action for fraud averaged $2,000 
apiece, and the state imposed a $50,000 damages cap on that type of 
claim, then a class action with more than twenty-five class members 
would dilute the potential per-plaintiff recovery. Proceeding with 
twenty-five or fewer class members risks decertification for lack of 
numerosity. Alternatively, if a class action attorney decided to move 
forward with more than twenty-five class members to satisfy the 
numerosity requirement, the diluting effect of adding class members 
would risk decertification under two Rule 23 provisions. Under Rule 
23(a)(4), it is questionable whether the class action attorney can 
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” when the 
very structure of the litigation will result in the undercompensation 
of class members.124 Similarly, under Rule 23(b)(3), the dilution 
effect would raise doubt about whether the class action “is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy” because a plaintiff would arguably be better off 
pursuing an individual claim free from the dilution effect.125 Thus, a 
low class action damages cap would make it difficult to assemble a 
sufficiently numerous class of plaintiffs that can be fairly and 
adequately represented and for which the class action is the superior 
method of adjudication. If state damages caps are aggressively 
ratcheted downward, they could be viewed by courts as the 
functional equivalents of categorical bars to maintaining class action 
 
 122. Berger & Brounell, supra note 64, at 285. 
 123. Current state laws imposing damages caps on class actions generally range from between 
$100,000 to $500,000. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, app. A for a list of state statutes 
imposing class action damages caps. 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 125. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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claims and therefore prohibited under Shady Grove. Whether this 
problem actually arises will depend on the legislative strategies that 
states adopt to regulate class actions in Shady Grove’s wake. 
3.  Shady Grove and State Regulation of 
Class Certification Requirements 
Some scholars have argued that where the Federal Rules provide 
only general procedural guidance, they can function as procedural 
vessels for state substantive rights in diversity cases.126 This would 
permit states to promulgate specific standards for numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation applicable 
to federal class certification proceedings.127 Following Shady Grove, 
how viable is this conception? 
Arguably, CAFA and Shady Grove constitute a Scylla and 
Charybdis128 for such state regulations, creating a narrow channel 
through which state laws embodying legislative class action policy 
preferences can enter federal courts. Congress intended CAFA to 
enable class action defendants to avail themselves of the federal 
courts to avoid permissive state class action certification practices. 
Now, however, with Shady Grove, it appears that state efforts to 
restrict the availability of the class action device in federal courts 
may also be incompatible with Rule 23. Justice Scalia’s gloss on 
Rule 23’s language as conferring a federal right to proceed with a 
class action when Rule 23’s requirements are met appeared 
unequivocal: 
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly 
empowers a federal court “to certify a class in each and 
every case” where the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is 
exactly what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed 
preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be 
 
 126. Watkins, supra note 40, at 298. For example, in Gasperini, the Court concluded that 
Rule 59 provided a general procedural standard for ordering new trials, including for cases in 
which damages were excessive, but held that a state rule providing a specific standard for 
determining when damages were excessive could give substantive content to Rule 59’s general 
procedural form. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996); Watkins, 
supra note 40, at 298. 
 127. Watkins, supra note 40, at 299 (“[F]ederal courts should consider state certification 
standards when deciding certification motions.”). 
 128. In Homer’s The Odyssey, Ulysses at one point must sail through a narrow, rocky 
corridor, assaulted from either side by two monsters, Scylla and Charybdis. HOMER, THE 
ODYSSEY 229–30 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Doubleday & Co. 1961). 
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maintained”—not “a class action may be permitted.” 
Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do.129 
Justice Stevens sounded a similar note in his concurrence, 
opining that “[f]ederal courts can and should interpret federal rules 
with sensitivity to ‘state prerogatives,’ but even when ‘state 
interests . . . warrant our respectful consideration,’ federal courts 
cannot rewrite the rules.”130 
While these comments suggest that the Court is inclined to 
protect Rule 23 from state regulatory erosion, exploitation of 
certification criteria will likely persist. By incorporating statutory 
requirements into state laws that indirectly interact with Rule 23 
certification criteria, state legislatures can limit federal class action 
litigation despite CAFA and Shady Grove.131 Without strong 
guidance from the Supreme Court, states are increasingly likely to 
write, and lower courts are increasingly likely to accept, state laws 
with such imbedded, indirect class action deterrents. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s plurality opinion in Shady Grove fails to provide 
lower courts with doctrinal clarity for analyzing future vertical 
conflict-of-law issues. This highlights a peculiar internal tension in 
the Court’s Erie jurisprudence. To advance Erie’s original 
purposes—to deter forum shopping and disparate litigation 
outcomes—the Court must provide clear vertical choice-of-law 
standards for judges and lawyers. Uncertainty as to what the Erie 
doctrine entails will in itself lead enterprising attorneys armed with 
creative arguments to exploit the doctrinal morass to circumvent 
adverse state or federal law. In this sense, Shady Grove undermines 
Erie’s underlying policies and calls for the Supreme Court’s 
reexamination. 
 
 129. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted). 
 131. For example, the inclusion of a pre-suit demand requirement as an element of recovery 
under a no-fault insurance statute creates a predominance problem for suits brought under Rule 
23(b)(3) without any reference to the class action device in statutory language. See DWFII Corp. 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 10-20116-CIV-UNGARO, 2010 WL 5094242 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 10, 2010) (distinguishing Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431). 
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